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‘The Object is to Change the Heart and Soul’: financial incentives, planning and 
opposition to new housebuilding in England  
 
Abstract 
 
In 2014 the UK government announced plans to reduce opposition to housing 
development by making a direct payment to households in Englandi.  This was part of 
a wider experiment with behavioural economics and financial inducements in 
planning policy.  In this paper we explore this proposal, named ‘Development 
Benefits’ (DB), arguing it offers important insights into how the governing rationality 
of neoliberalism attempts to govern both planning and opposition to development by 
replacing political debate with a depoliticised economic rationality. Drawing on 
householder and key player responses to the DB proposal we highlight significant 
levels of principled objection to the replacement of traditional forms of planning 
reason with financial logics. The paper therefore contributes to understandings of 
planning as a site of ongoing resistance to neoliberal rationalities. We conclude by 
questioning whether DBs represents a particular strand of ‘late neoliberal’ 
governmentality, exploring the potential for an alternative planning rationality to 
contest the narrow marketisation of planning ideas and practices.    
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Introduction 
The neoliberal project is characterised by belief that the extended role of the modern 
state distorts the rational guiding hand of free market economic preferences.  Since 
the 1980s this principle has led to numerous experiments in the reshaping of state 
intervention through the application of market logics across economic and social 
policy, favouring individualised over collective engagement with service provision. 
Neoliberal government seeks not only to privatise but to economise and monetise the 
political landscape, narrowing wider democratic debate to issues of price and 
encouraging citizens to view themselves as individualised customers (Brown, 2015).  
Margaret Thatcher’s statement that “Economics are the method; the object is to 
change the heart and soul” has therefore been taken as a foundational statement of the 
political rationality of neoliberal government and its intention to remake citizen-
subjectivities (Butt, 1981; Dardot and Laval, 2014: 44).   
 
Our interest in this paper is with a particular experiment in neoliberal statecraft 
proposed by UK governments to ease or remove opposition to house-building in 
England by making direct financial payments, labelled ‘development benefits’, to 
residents likely to be affected by development. We argue this initiative can be 
characterised as a distinctive extension of wider neoliberal experiments with 
governing through economic methods, incorporating ‘financial policy instruments’ 
(du Gay et al, 2012) as a technology for transforming prevailing planning 
rationalities.  
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From a governmental perspective, the logic underpinning this ‘behavioural economic’ 
intervention has intuitive appeal. The global financial crisis of 2007-8 exacerbated 
long term, significant shortfalls in new house-building, viewed as a root cause of a 
widely perceived ‘housing crisis’ in Englandii. Against an estimated need for more 
than 200,000iii new houses to be built annually only 107,980 units were completed in 
2012-13 (MHCLG, 2018). Resident opposition (often unhelpfully referred to as 
NIMBYism) can be a powerful constraint on development, especially when exercised 
through planning systems with strong elements of devolved, local democratic 
decision-making.  As the UK government has recognised, opposition to development 
might be a rational response where development is perceived to threaten existing 
residential amenity and property values.  A financial contribution compensating for 
perceived losses may therefore reduce opposition or even, in the words of one UK 
Housing Minister transform the very subjectivities of opponents, turning them from 
“NIMBYs” into “homebuilders” (Inch, 2012).   
 
Making direct payments to residents to reduce opposition therefore represents an 
attempt to shift the “heart and soul” of state-citizen relations in planning through 
appeal to a core item of neoliberal faith, i.e. that citizens will respond as homo-
oeconomicus to ‘rational’ economic incentivisation (Brown, 2015). There are 
considerable practical issues surrounding who should receive such a payment and 
how much would need to be offered, however, the efficacy and legitimacy of the 
approach rests on the assumption that issues which generate political opposition to 
new housebuilding can be addressed through some form of financial payment. As 
such, the proposal raised profound challenges for the established ethos and practices 
of planning, including concerns about the impacts on formally democratic decision-
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making processes of reducing planning in the public interest to a matter of financial 
calculation. The prospect of the state or developers ‘buying’ planning permission is 
highly controversial when the core task of planning is understood to be making the 
case and regulating for good quality place-making that respects or enhances existing 
residential amenity.  
 
The paper draws on our involvement in research commissioned by the UK 
government to test the feasibility of the proposed “development benefits” (DB) policy. 
We trace the origins of the experiment as a response to the problematic politics of 
planning for potentially unpopular new housing, the reaction of key target 
constituencies and the decision by government to abandon the proposal. Beyond the 
particularities of this initiative, our wider interest is in the significance of attempts to 
use financial incentives to remake planning and wider democratic relations under 
neoliberal rule in the UK and beyond.   
 
We therefore make three distinctive contributions to debates about the reshaping of 
planning ideas, practices and subjectivities. First, in an era marked by the widespread 
problematisation and even “scapegoating” of planning (Gunder, 2016), we argue it is 
important to critically examine the construction of opposition to development as a 
problem requiring governmental intervention. In particular this requires that research 
carefully separate evidence of opposition and the forms of political pressure this 
generates for national and local government from any necessary relation to the 
perceived delays and blockages that have motivated governmental reform initiatives 
in states and jurisdictions internationally.  
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Secondly, we argue that strong principled opposition to this proposal offers insight 
into continuing resistances to the idea that planning decisions should be governed by 
economic logics and individual self-interest. If the object of development benefits was 
to change the “heart and soul” of planning-citizen relations by interpellating citizens’ 
as caricatures of homo-oeconomicus, the abandonment of the scheme highlights how 
financial considerations struggled to rework established rationalities of planning. 
Responses to DB also therefore reveal ongoing commitment to established forms of 
planning reason, resistant to any intimation that planning permission can be ‘bought 
and sold’ and potentially offering insight into political alternatives to the neoliberal 
problematisation of planning. 
 
Thirdly, we suggest the problem that underpinned the DB policy – how to reconcile 
development and socio-political reproduction – can only be effectively addressed by 
engaging with the broader non-financial basis of opposition to development and the 
political subjectivities it generates. In this regard, we argue the limited purchase of the 
DB proposal illustrates a wider, but as yet politically uncertain, problematisation of 
the extent to which market discipline can be relied on to realise public interest 
objectives. We therefore speculate that the apparent ‘failure’ of the DB policy in 
England may be considered part of a phase of ‘late’ neoliberalism in which the 
political significance of the housing question has begun to unsettle core assumptions 
underpinning the government of land-use regulation.  
 
The rest of the paper is structured in seven parts. We first examine core features of the 
neoliberal problematisations of planning and then opposition to development. We then 
go on to explore how successive governments in England have struggled to manage 
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the politics of local opposition within the terms of this dominant logic, leading to a 
succession of attempts to govern from a distance. This allows us to trace the 
emergence of financial incentives as a response to a persistent policy problem framed 
by neoliberal concerns about planning’s perceived lack of responsiveness to market 
signals. We then describe the attitudes of citizens, planners and local elected officials 
towards the development benefits proposal, highlighting both principled and practical 
resistance to the extension of economic logics to discipline and reshape local planning 
cultures. A discussion of the implications of the turn towards financial incentives and 
the resistances it encountered follows, assessing what this suggests for the politics and 
possibilities of a democratic planning rationality capable of governing opposition to 
housing development under late neoliberalism. A short conclusion then recaps the 
central contributions the paper makes. 
 
Neoliberal Government and the Problem of Planning 
Neoliberal concern for the proper limits of state activity built on the grounds of what 
Foucault ([1980] 2008: 76) described as a prevailing anxiety or “phobia of the state” 
and its perceived constraint on the free flow of markets and individual choice (Dardot 
and Laval, 2014). This has led to a pronounced emphasis on what Mitchell Dean 
(2006) calls the “government of government” - the widespread problematisation and 
attempted transformation of established state practices, like spatial planning, through 
the introduction of new disciplinary techniques. These are intended not just to limit 
the role of the state vis-a-vis the economy as in classical liberal theories but to bring 
actors’ conduct in line with new forms of (marketised) governing rationalityiv.  
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Drawing on Foucault’s prescient analysis of the governmental rationality of 
neoliberalism, Wendy Brown (2015: 9-10) points to the centrality of homo-
oeconomicus as the subject through which neoliberal government seeks to: 
 
…transmogrify[y] every human domain and endeavor, along with humans 
themselves, according to a specific image of the economic...In neoliberal 
reason and in domains governed by it, we are only and everywhere homo 
oeconomicus”  
 
Brown (2015: 221) further argues that the political rationality of neoliberalism is 
characterised by the displacement of homo-politicus and the reduction of government 
to governance, understood as a technical exercise in depoliticised problem-solving: 
 
The neoliberal solution to problems is always more markets, more complete 
markets, more perfect markets, more financialization, new technologies, new 
ways to monetize. Anything but collaborative and contestatory human 
decision making, control over the conditions of existence, planning for the 
future; anything but deliberate constructions of existence through democratic 
discussion, law, policy. Anything but the human knowledge, deliberation, 
judgment, and action classically associated with homo politicus   
 
For Foucault ([1980] 2008: 76) neoliberal state-phobia was significantly reinforced by 
the demonization of post-war economic planning. Attempts to reform state regulation 
of land and property markets across the global north since the early 1980s, highlight a 
broad sense in which planning ideas and practices have remained a problem for 
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neoliberal government (e.g. Lord and Tewdwr-Jones, 2013; Gunder, 2016). Repeated 
reform initiatives illustrate the extent to which planning has become a site of political 
attention and active policy experimentation as governments have sought to re-shape 
institutions, attitudes and practices considered out of step with prevailing political 
rationalities, even where evidence of negative economic impacts remains limited 
(Adams and Watkins, 2014; Gurran and Phibbs, 2013). This leads Gunder (2016) to 
argue planning has become an ideological scapegoat, constructed as a key 
impediment, blocking the fulfilment of late capitalist society’s policy fantasies of the 
better futures that unfettered market-led development will deliver.  
 
Debates about the definition and limits of neoliberalism highlight dangers in 
overstating the scope and power of neoliberalism to remake government and society 
(e.g. Barnett, 2010; Peck, 2014).  Many accounts, including Brown’s (e.g. Honig, 
2017), have been accused of exaggerating the dominance of neoliberal rationalities 
whilst overlooking their fallibility, the complex ways in which they fail and 
perpetually provoke resistances, what Foucault labelled “counter-conducts”, premised 
on “refusals of specific forms of governmental power” (Huxley, 2018: 213; Rose et 
al, 2008).  
 
Continued experimentation in “the government of planning” illustrates that the field 
presents particular challenges for the roll-out of market-based rationalities, in part 
because active spatial management and land use control is socially, electorally and 
economically important and frequently controversial (Peck and Tickell, 1992; 
Allmendinger and Haughton, 2012). Brown’s ‘homo-politicus’ (or following 
Matthews et al (2014) ‘homo-democraticus’) rather than homo-oeconomicus has 
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therefore tended to figure as a core subject of planning rationalities. As such, planning 
provides a potentially productive “way in” to explore the “variable practices, 
manifestations and spaces of resistance” that continue to shape the uneven, variegated 
and contested neoliberalisation of spatial government (Allmendinger and Haughton, 
2012: 24; Brenner et al, 2010).  Exploring the power of neoliberal rationalities 
therefore requires attentiveness to the complex ways in which “[p]lanning both 
encounters and calls forth resistances to particular exercises of governmentality, 
inciting and enacting counter-conducts that are refusals to be governed ‘like that’” 
(Huxley, 2018: 215). 
 
The Problem of Opposition to Development   
 
In general, planning systems are charged with managing the contradictory demands 
generated by capitalist urbanisation and the political tensions this generates.  
This role involves reconciling competing societal desires, for example, to ensure 
continuous development, conservation of land or the amenity of existing 
homeowners. The legitimacy of planning as a governmental activity frequently rests 
on its ability to mediate or displace conflict generated by development. 
 
Opposition to development can be motivated by a wide range of concerns from the 
protection of assets, commitments to environmental or social-justice through to desire 
to exclude particular social groups from a neighbourhood. Often it is underpinned by 
strong place attachments and mistrust of the impacts of development (see e.g. 
Davison et al, 2016; Matthews et al, 2014). It is, therefore, important to critically 
explore the variety of different concerns motivating opposition, the diverse political 
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configurations that it can take across diverse geographical sites and how this shapes 
its (perceived and actual) efficacy and subsequent policy responses.  
 
Established scholarship challenges use of the term Not-In-My-Back-Yard (NIMBY), 
highlighting its frequent use to delegitimize opposition, reducing the motivations of 
opponents to narrow self-interest (Burningham, 2000). The prevalence of opposition 
has, however, led to recurring political concern that planning processes are proving 
incapable of governing ‘NIMBY’ mobilizations against locally unwanted land uses, 
generating significant negative impacts for economic efficiency and social justice by, 
for example, displacing unwanted development onto communities less able to defend 
themselves or preventing the construction of socially necessary infrastructure, 
including new housing (Schively, 2007).  
 
Growth pressures in economically important regions frequently bring the imperatives 
of market-led development for economic competitiveness into conflict with property-
owners committed to the defence of residential areas and property values they have 
been encouraged to understand symbols of aspiration and reward for their 
commitment to the virtues of the free-market order (Lake, 1993). In such contexts 
homeowners, with the social and cultural capital to make themselves heard and who 
perceive new development as a threat, can form locally powerful political lobbies that 
exert influence through planning systems.  
 
 
Opposition to development has therefore been constructed as an increasingly 
significant problem across the global north in recent years (see e.g. Myers, 2007 in the 
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US; Sturzaker, 2010 in the UK; Davison et al, 2016 in Australia), contributing to 
dissatisfaction with planning and generating attempts to streamline development 
regulation and democratic influence. However, if planning processes struggle to 
manage such conflict, the resultant political tensions also pose challenges for attempts 
to leave planning to the market as deregulation runs the risk of alienating the 
ideologically and electorally important support of ‘homeowners’. 
 
In England, the focus of the present paper, middle-class homeowners are often 
supportive of strong local planning controls as a means of maintaining existing 
residential amenity, shaping conservative local planning cultures in certain, typically 
affluent, locations (e.g. Vigar et al, 2000; Murdoch and Abram, 2002). Hall et al’s 
classic study The Containment of Urban England evidenced regressive distributive 
effects produced by the conservative operation of planning controls (Hall, 1974). 
However, despite clear evidence of continued opposition (Matthews et al, 2014), and 
case studies illustrating the tactics and effectiveness of opponents (Sturzaker, 2010), 
there is less aggregate, contemporary evidence of the overall role of opposition in 
either slowing or blocking housing development.  
 
In the context of neoliberal state-phobia and the ‘scapegoating’ of planning, it is 
important to critically assess the ways in which both planning and opposition to 
development are constructed as problems requiring the application of particular 
governmental responses. We return to these arguments below, first however we 
explore the emergence of financial incentives as a technology designed to govern 
‘from a distance’ in response to the perceived problems of planning’s economic 
irrationality and the politically problematic strength of local opposition to 
development. 
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Governing opposition to housing development in England 
The political unpopularity of new housing development has long created difficulties 
for national planning policy in England, leading to a succession of attempts to govern 
local decision-making from a distance (Murdoch, 2004). From the early 2000s 
onwards, concern about affordability and the negative socio-economic consequences 
of house price inflation led to the ‘rediscovery’ of housing supply as a political 
problem in England (Bramley, 2007). Prevailing approaches had operated through a 
‘numbers game’ where targets for quantities of new housing were negotiated between 
levels of government (Vigar et al, 2000). Operating alongside the prioritisation of 
urban regeneration on previously developed land, however, this mechanism was 
increasingly considered too weak to guarantee required levels of new supply.  
 
As a result, New Labour governments in the 2000s strengthened regional planning, 
allocated large-scale urban extensions to become ‘sustainable communities’ and 
appointed Kate Barker, a former member of the Bank of England’s monetary policy 
committee, to review housing supply and the land-use planning system (Barker, 2004, 
2006). Barker’s recommendations, backed at the time by a parallel review of local 
government finance (Lyons, 2007)v, led to increases in regional housing targets but 
centred on the need to make the planning system more responsive to market signals. 
This included proposals to introduce incentives for local planning authorities to 
promote higher levels of housebuilding. 
 
Both the Barker and Lyons’ reviews, argued that, particularly in areas of high market 
demand, local authorities and communities were expected to accept new housing 
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development that generated negative externalities (such as increased congestion and 
pressure on school places) but were not adequately compensated through the highly 
centralized system of local government finance prevailing in England. Understood in 
orthodox economic terms, opposition could be considered a collective action problem; 
despite any wider, collective benefits it is rational for individual owners whose 
property values and quality of life are negatively affected by development to object to 
proposals.  
 
The turn towards financial incentives resonated with the wider currency of 
behavioural economics within the civil service at this time, notably the powerful 
Treasury. Such approaches therefore influenced successive governments, symbolised 
by the setting up of a so-called ‘nudge unit’ or ‘behavioural insights team' in the 
Cabinet Office in 2010 to introduce ideas from behavioural economics and 
psychology to find 'intelligent ways to encourage, support and enable people to make 
better choices for themselves' (Cabinet Office, 2011: 3; Leggett, 2015). The emphasis 
placed on financial incentives under a Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition 
government from 2010-2015 therefore represented a continuation of attempts to find 
new ways of governing a long-standing policy problem which had become more acute 
as a result of a precipitous decline in new housebuilding following the 2007-8 
financial crisis.  
 
Financial Incentives as a Governmental Technology 
 
Both coalition partners had made election pledges to revoke the regional planning 
structures created by their New Labour predecessors, arguing the locally unpopular 
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housing ‘targets’ they imposed were symptomatic of a failed, centralising approach to 
government. In place of this regime, the Conservatives had promised a “revolution” in 
planning that would be achieved by “replacing top-down targets with bottom-up 
decision-making, transferring powers currently held by remote and unaccountable 
quangos into the hands of local communities” (Conservative Party, 2009: 9).  
 
The new ‘localist’ planning system promised to simplify national guidance and 
decentralize power to local peoplevi. However, the proposals promised not only to 
minimise the disruptive role of the central state in planning for housing but also to 
find new ways of dealing with the problem of local opposition and therefore to 
facilitate increased housebuilding: 
 
…to make this local decision-making work, we need also to change the 
incentives provided by the financial framework…The solution lies in giving 
local councils and local communities incentives for house building, not 
targets. By creating a real and substantial financial incentive to reward 
communities that accept house building, we guarantee that those directly 
affected by development are those that benefit. (Conservative Party, 2009:9) 
 
As in other parts of the world, financial instruments have been deployed in England to 
mitigate negative externalities and secure community benefits from development. 
However, legal agreements called planning obligations were previously agreed and 
levied at the local authority scale (Crook, 2016). The new proposals promised to go 
further. By appealing directly to the rational self-interest of local communities, 
imagined as the biddable homo-oeconomicus of neoliberal thought (Matthews et al, 
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2014), it would be possible to produce new, pro-development citizen-subjectivities, 
accepting of the need for development. The introduction of financial incentives in 
place of directive targets was rhetorically constructed as a key to turning New 
Labour’s NIMBY’s into enthusiastic enablers of development (Inch, 2012). 
 
In this regard, the localism of the Coalition government revealed itself less as a 
project to decentralise and empower local actors and more as a distinctive articulation 
of the political rationality of neoliberalism, seeking to govern from a distance by 
shaping an environment in which individual freedom and choice would be exercised 
in ‘responsible’ ways (Miller and Rose, 1992; Clarke and Cochrane, 2013). Financial 
incentives, were positioned as the technology through which this responsible approach 
could be brought about, a ‘financial policy instrument’ intended to change attitudes 
and behaviours by appealing to the rational self-interest of homo-oeconomicus (du 
Gay et at, 2012). 
 
The initial result of the shift towards incentives was the introduction of the New 
Homes Bonus (NHB), a financial payment made to local authorities for six years for 
each new home built within their boundaries (Dunning et al, 2014). The NHB was 
intended to target the attitudes and behaviour of both local planning authorities and 
communities who, understood as financially motivated economic actors, would be 
able to clearly see the benefits of accepting growth.  
 
The coalition government was committed to making financial considerations, like the 
NHB, a core consideration in local planning. England’s planning practices have 
evolved in a distinctive manner since the right to develop land was nationalized in 
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1947 with plans guiding but not zoning development, leaving considerable discretion 
to decision-makers to weigh up the ‘material considerations’ relevant to development 
proposals on a case-by-case basis. What constitutes a ‘material planning 
consideration’ has never been defined in legislation and case law has established a 
broad understanding that anything related to the use and development of land is 
potentially relevant to decision-making. However, one enduring principle has been 
that development rights cannot be “bought and sold” as this would threaten the 
probity of decisions taken in the public interest (Walter, 2012). Debates around the 
buying and selling of planning permission have been particularly pronounced in 
relation to how planning gain should be recouped and the extent to which potential 
benefits should influence decision-makingvii (e.g. Crook, 2016). 
 
These debates were rehearsed again when government revised planning legislation to 
explicitly include ‘local finance considerations’ as a material consideration. The 
national planning professional body, the Royal Town Planning Institute (2011), argued 
that the change threatened to undermine established principles of planning decision-
making, where financial considerations should only be given weight if they are 
capable of making otherwise unacceptable development proposals acceptable in 
planning terms. Government sought to ease these fears by stating it simply wanted to 
ensure incentives were explicitly considered, not that they should be the basis for 
decision-making. The episode nonetheless, highlighted the extent to which financial 
incentives continued to be considered a potentially inappropriate influence.  
 
In practice, meanwhile, a parliamentary select committee was highly critical of the 
government for its failure to evaluate the impacts of the NHB (House of Commons, 
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2013). Subsequent, government-funded research suggested that, whilst many local 
authorities understood the bonus as a potentially powerful incentive, very few felt it 
had any effect on decision-making or, crucially, that it had or should filter down to 
local residents (Dunning et al, 2014).  
 
In January 2013, Nick Boles, the government minister for Planning, drew on a recent 
report by the think-tank he had previously led, Policy Exchange, to propose what he 
described as a direct “bribe” (which he wanted to call the “Boles Bung”) to 
communities who took advantage of new powers to draw up statutory neighbourhood 
plans. In exchange for designating higher levels of housebuilding in such plans, 
neighbourhood groups would be offered direct control of up to 25% of planning gain 
levies collected from developers (Wintour, 2013).  
 
By the end of 2013 the author of that report, Alex Morton, had become a government 
advisor and, coincidentally or otherwise, the Chancellor of the Exchequer George 
Osbourne announced proposals to pilot a new policy initiative “to ensure that 
households benefit from developments in their local area” by offering direct payments 
to reshape attitudes and behaviour and thereby reduce opposition to new housing 
development (HM Treasury, 2013, see also Haughton and Allmendinger, 2016).  
 
Direct ‘development benefits’ payments to households therefore emerged as an 
extension of an incentives-based approach to disciplining local planning decision-
making that was being actively pursued within and around government. In the next 
section below, we assess the proposed development benefits scheme and how this 
further appeal to homo-oeconomicus was received.  
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Exploring the Logic and Limits of Development Benefits 
 
The potential for financial incentives in planning has long attracted economists.  
However, there are many knotty political and practical choices about how a financial 
incentive for development operates, for example who receives the payments (spatial 
distribution, owner/resident) and whether the payment should be made to those who 
oppose development or to all those who live in a defined catchment area?  The 
question of whether the payment might be made to all residents rather than those who 
oppose is important because (a) a payment to all residents might involve considerable 
deadweight payments to households not opposed; and (b) an incentive to all residents 
might encourage those who are neutral or in favour of development to challenge those 
who resist. However, as policy-makers recognised, there was limited direct evidence 
to inform the Development Benefits proposal. Indeed the evaluation study reported on 
in this paper was seen as providing an important evidence base in the absence of 
knowledge of any meaningful testing of individualised financial inducements in 
planning systems internationally. 
 
The “overall aim” of the “Development Benefit (DB) model” was “to reduce the 
extent to which development is blocked or delayed as a result of opposition by local 
residents” (Communities and Local Government [CLG], 2014a). The pilot DB 
scheme was intended to contain three elements: an initial theoretical evaluation of the 
model, a series of local authority pilots and a subsequent evaluation of their findings. 
The authors’ were part of the research team contracted to conduct the first stage, 
theoretical evaluation exploring: drivers of opposition, and the extent to which DB 
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might address these; the potential impact of payments on attitudes and behaviour 
towards development; the potential impact on housing supply; and the impact on the 
planning system (for further details, including an extended explanation of the research 
approach and methods, see CLG, 2017).  
 
The core of the study was a survey of attitudes to financial payment involving 
residents living within 200m radius of potentially contentious sites for new 
housebuilding where opposition would be likely if development proposals came 
forward. The sample of residents was drawn from six areas, purposively selected to 
represent geographic, urban-rural and planning policy variation across England (from 
a typology of all local planning authorities, reported in Dunning et al., 2014) as well 
as the presence of both pressure for housing development and opposition to either the 
local plan or recent planning applications. 
 
109 householder interviewees were recruited (minimum of 15 per case study) through 
an initial telephone screening of a random sample of commercially available 
telephone contacts. The screening identified householders that were “likely to oppose 
new housebuilding” and were willing to participate in an interview either via 
telephone or face-to-face. We also conducted telephone interviews with 3-5 ‘key 
players’, local planning officers, politicians or development industry representatives, 
working in each local authority area (22 interviewees in total) to contextualise the 
level of opposition to development in their locality and to canvas their views on the 
principle and practicability of DB.  
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The audio-recorded interviews covered attitudinal evidence about opposition to 
development; the DB proposal; and perceptions of the role of financial incentives in 
planning decision-making. They involved a series of open questions such as ‘Would 
you be opposed to new housebuilding in your local area?’, but householder interviews 
also included closed, multiple choice questions, such as ‘If you were to receive a 
financial payment if new housing development went ahead, would you be less likely 
to oppose the development?’ (Yes / No/ Maybe / Don’t Know). For each closed 
question, interviewees were given the option to explain their answer.  
 
Background and Motivations for Opposition 
In general the householder interviews included a spread of responses across age and 
income categories, albeit with a bias towards wealthier owner-occupiers who existing 
research identifies as more likely to oppose new development (72% were aged 50 
plus). Whilst all of those interviewed had been pre-screened and therefore considered 
themselves ‘likely to oppose’ new development, 25% self-identified as very strongly 
opposed, with 44% strongly opposed and 31% viewing their opposition in weaker 
terms. 55% suggested they were likely to act on their opposition, typically by making 
representations to their local authority but also by contacting councillors or attending 
meetings. Whilst aware of local campaign groups, few of those interviewed were 
directly involved or felt they were influenced by such activities. 
 
Opposition to new housing development was described by respondents in a variety of 
different ways, but frequently focused around the impacts of new development on 
amenity and infrastructure: 
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So when they’re talking about new housing developments, that’s great if you 
have infrastructure: schools and roads and GP practices. The schools have 
been great – the surgeries are great. It’s not about their quality of service, it’s 
their capacity really. (Householder in South-West)  
 
This was particularly marked in case study areas with recent histories of major 
development, with concerns raised about cumulative effects on the character of local 
environments: 
 
... it just seems like this area is being swamped with the volume of houses. 
Slowly but surely, its turning into one big sprawl. We will lose the village and 
community feel of the place ... (Householder in London commuter belt)  
 
In addition, particularly in London, householders expressed concerns that the cost of 
new housing meant it was not affordable for “normal people”viii. 
 
Whilst most of the householders interviewed believed they had a good grasp of 
planning issues, many felt their power to influence decision-making was limited: 
 
I can play no role at all in influencing planning. There’s nothing I can do as 
the council don’t care. I feel totally helpless and ignored as a citizen. This is a 
consensus in the community. (Householder in London commuter belt)  
 
Responses to DB- Principled Objections 
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The headline responses to the idea of DB from both the household and key player 
interviews were strong and clear. 84% of respondents stated that a financial payment 
would not make them less likely to oppose housing development. Only 6% of 
households stated that a payment would encourage them to be less opposed to housing 
development. Of those, the majority estimated £4,000 or more would be required to 
alter their behaviour.  
 
Significantly, the notion of a payment was described by 48% of householders using 
derivations of the concept of bribery, including “corruption” and “backhanders”:  
 
To be given the offer of a payment doesn’t sound right. It’s unfair, it is buying 
people off. Regardless of your opinion, if you are given money, it negates 
your right to express an opinion. I wouldn’t take it. It would feel like blood 
money.” (Householder in South-East)  
 
The reaction of key players was no different, with the notion of payment being met 
with “widespread distaste”, referred to as “insulting” by one elected member and, 
tellingly, as giving the impression of the “buying and selling of planning permission” 
by another.  
 
Evidence from the interviews therefore pointed towards strong principled objections 
to DB on the basis that planning decisions should not be influenced by direct financial 
payments and that opposition to new development should not be “bought off”.  
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By extension, interviewees also suggested alternative perceptions of how planning 
decisions should be made; principles it was feared would be distorted by the 
introduction of individual payments. Several householders and elected members, for 
example, raised objections based on the potential for payments to fundamentally alter 
the democratic processes around planning decisions:  
 
I would be appalled if people – residents and/or elected members were not 
allowed to give their views freely and development benefits is questionable in 
relation to the democratic process. (Elected member in East) 
 
One householder in the east of England noted clearly: “I don’t want the payment, I 
want to be involved and the community involved that is payment enough.  I would 
rather have them listen and act rather than give me a payment”, suggesting a 
commitment to planning decisions being made through a process of local democratic 
deliberation. 
 
Key players interviewed were particularly concerned about potentially negative, 
unintended effects, including that payments would undermine their attempts to engage 
communities in conversation, harness legitimate opposition as a means of improving 
development outcomes or build acceptance in the longer term.  They saw DB as 
potentially undermining trust relations, serving to “inflame and antagonise” in 
contexts where communities frequently doubted that local authorities and government 
represented their best interests, rather than those of profit-seeking developers. 
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Householders too suggested that payments could negatively impact community 
cohesion, fostering rather than mediating conflict, both between households receiving 
payments and those outside any prospective payment boundary, and between 
households accepting or rejecting payment:  
 
I think it could cause really bad feeling, if one gets it and another doesn’t. It 
would stop some people fully exploring their options. It almost breaks up a 
community by giving cash to people (Householder in London commuter belt) 
 
A clear view therefore emerged that payments would potentially have divisive 
impacts, principally on (1) local community relations - between those receiving the 
payment and those not, and (2) the relationships between local authority officers, 
elected members and communities.  
 
This was linked to a wider view that the impacts of planning decisions should and 
could not be individualized or determined solely by proximity to development. Many 
interviewees expressed a desire to see resources directed towards collective provision 
of infrastructure rather than DB: 
 
 If money is available, it would be better spent on people’s real concerns - 
infrastructure and education (Member of neighbourhood planning forum, 
South-East).  
 
This argument was particularly strongly presented by key players in the East of 
England and London commuter belt case studies. In the latter the local authority had 
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developed a strategy of allocating large sites that would take a significant percentage 
of the Borough’s projected housing need. This strategy had been developed over a 
number of years, prompted by long-standing political opposition to development, 
concern at the effects of gradual in-fill on the ‘village’ character of the area, and a 
strong local consensus that infrastructure had failed to keep pace with development. 
Major development sites were considered a locally acceptable approach to the 
problematic politics of planning for housing, enabling fragile agreement that 
development was necessary and should be positively planned to maximise public 
benefits. As the impacts of large-scale development were felt collectively across the 
Borough, it was argued that all available funds should be channelled into 
infrastructure provision. Concerns were also expressed that financial payments may 
undermine the hard work that had gone into securing political commitment to the 
large sites strategy.  
 
Responses to DB- Practical Objections 
In addition to principled objections, interviewees also suggested a range of more 
practical concerns about how any DB scheme could be made to work. Many 
householders, for example, queried the level of payment that would be required to 
influence people’s behaviour, asking where the money for DB would come from and 
whether such payments could be afforded without undermining the viability of 
development or reducing planning gain.  
 
In addition, respondents pointed to apparent flaws in the logic of the proposal. For 
example, since it was not intended to directly influence planning decisions, proposed 
payment would not be conditional on the withdrawal of opposition: 
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If it’s a big enough payment, won’t most people take it? I suppose I might take 
the money and oppose too (Householder, east of England). 
 
Beyond such significant practicalities, key players also questioned whether the 
proposed payment was targeting a problem that really needed to be addressed: 
 
Any planning system can deliver development if you have the political will, 
DBs are a complete irrelevance (Planning Consultant, south-west)  
 
Echoing the views of householders who felt opposition was rarely effective in 
blocking or delaying development, key players argued the planning system was 
already set up to facilitate development proposals against opposition. For example, 
the threat of costly appeals promoted a risk-averse culture to refusing planning 
permission in increasingly cash-strapped local authorities. As a result some 
interviewees suggested that opposition, whilst vehement and politically challenging, 
was often rendered somewhat symbolic, highlighting a need to separate the political 
conflict generated from any necessary impacts on development activity. 
 
Contrary to the rhetoric of localism, other changes introduced under the coalition 
government were also felt to have reduced local control over development, and 
therefore the potential efficacy of opposition. Most notable here were the effects of a 
new National Planning Policy Framework which had mandated that local plans would 
only be approved where they could prove a five-year supply of economically viable 
land was available for housing development. In the absence of an up-to-date plan, 
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there was a presumption in favour of sustainable development that would leave 
authorities vulnerable to speculative development applications. As a result, the 
emerging planning regime had generated considerable anxiety, with many authorities 
drawn into arguments about the viability of sites as they struggled to have plans 
approved. Key players therefore worried their power to shape development had been 
significantly reduced and expressed concern that unplanned housing development 
may stimulate further opposition, undermining attempts to sustain political will 
around the need for new housing.  
 
Having summarized these responses, in the next section we analyse what they tell us 
about the role of financial incentives as a governmental technology for re-shaping 
local political opposition to housing development and bringing citizens into line with 
the governing rationalities of neoliberalism. 
 
Discussion: DB and the prospects for planning in late neoliberal times  
  
The results of the theoretical evaluation were clear and unequivocal, raising a range of 
both principled and practical objections to the proposed DB scheme. Following the 
submission of our findings, the government received only three expressions of interest 
from local authorities to pilot DB. The proposal was then quietly droppedix. If the ex-
ante evaluation was important in rendering visible the political tensions and practical 
difficulties associated with DBs, the programme was abandoned primarily due to the 
lack of local authority interest.  Given our findings that lack of interest is not 
surprising. Involvement in pilots would likely have been highly contentious for local 
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authorities struggling to manage the fallout from a more permissive approach to 
development at national level.   
 
The withdrawal of the DB proposal is not necessarily a final setback for the use of 
individualised financial incentives in planning in England. Only a year later a 
Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May, intervened to redirect proposed 
community benefit payments for unconventional gas developments from local 
authorities direct to households (Boffey, 2016). Government has also further 
legislated so that "financial benefits information" needs to be included in all planning 
officers' reports to elected decision-makers (Housing and Planning Act, 2016). This 
suggests a continued concern to financially discipline planning processes and a 
potential for further experimentation with incentive-based planning reforms as a 
means of producing more economically rational behaviour at the local level. There is 
also some evidence that austerity is intensifying financial pressures on local 
authorities in ways that may increase the weight afforded to financial considerations 
in future (Raco, 2018). 
 
Despite the withdrawal of DB, responses to the proposal generated significant insights 
into both the nature and efficacy of opposition to development and planning as a site 
of resistance to financial policy instruments. Our evidence on opposition to 
development is inevitably partial in its focus. The study did not involve a real 
payment, which might elicit a different response, or explore whether payment might 
mobilise support for development. In addition, it does not account for potentially 
diverse configurations of the politics of opposition across England (let alone more 
widely). Nonetheless, key players questioning of whether the DB policy proposal 
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targeted a ‘real’ problem raises the possibility that opposition to development may be 
a political issue without necessarily having significant effects on the allocation of land 
for new housebuilding (or necessarily figuring as a chief cause of national housing 
supply shortages). This resonates with Gunder’s (2016) concern that planning has 
become a scapegoat for the reluctance or inability of neoliberal governments to 
manage market failures that require more active state intervention.  
 
It is therefore important to consider the extent to which a focus on opposition to 
development as a key issue may have contributed to a failure to explore other 
potential causes of low levels of new housebuilding including, for example, 
underlying patterns of land-ownership, financialisation and the business models of 
developers (Cochrane et al, 2015; Edwards, 2016; Archer and Cole, 2016). This 
highlights the importance of carefully distinguishing the construction of ‘problems’, 
like planning delays and opposition to development, from their political or planning 
effects on the ground. 
 
The turn to financial incentives in England exemplifies what Wendy Brown (2015) 
and others identify as core features of the political rationality of neoliberalism (see 
above).  The DB model proposed to reshape planning relations by appealing to the 
financial self-interest of homo-oeconomicus (see also Matthews et al, 2014), seeking 
to introduce a particular form of individualising, economic logic into the traditionally 
more collective and policy-based rationalities of planning. Reflecting the continued 
power of state-phobia and its expression through neoliberal mistrust of public 
planning, a financialised landscape of planning decision-making would undermine the 
potential for a collective state planning solution.  
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The evolution from the NHB to DB, a more individualized form of incentive, was 
promoted by influential think-tanks and illustrates how, in spite of evidence of failure, 
the neoliberal solution has been to call for more rather than less application of 
technologies of economic governance (cf. Haughton and Allmendinger, 2016). The 
turn towards ‘financial policy instruments’ (du Gay et al, 2012) as a means of 
governing planning therefore represents a distinctive extension of forms of 
experimental state-craft that have been central to the roll-out of neoliberal 
rationalities; further illustrating how England has been at the leading edge of 
experimentation in the reworking of established planning logics (cf. Allmendinger 
and Haughton, 2013).  
 
Tellingly, there have been recent signs of a shift in governmental rhetoric around 
planning for housing in England. The intensification of the ‘housing crisis’ as a 
national political issue and recognition that levels of housebuilding are running well 
below the numbers of planning permissions granted (Shelter, 2017) has led politicians 
to begin questioning the role of the private sector in the production of housing 
shortages. Conservative manifesto commitments to support a return to council house 
building and heightened state powers to tax land values (e.g. Conservative and 
Unionist Party, 2017) point to a change in previously prevailing rhetoric and a greater 
willingness to consider market failure as a cause of housing supply shortages. It 
remains to be seen whether or how this might translate into concrete policy change. 
However, it seems possible core assumptions underpinning the neoliberal 
problematisation of land-use regulation may be open to question in new ways. 
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Political opportunities may therefore be emerging to reshape the rationalities 
governing planning under late neoliberalism. 
 
In this context of potential political change, it is important to consider what the 
vehement resistance to the DB model can tell us about the limits to neoliberal 
rationalities and their power to reshape “the heart and soul” of planning in England.  
 
As Huxley (2018, 216) argues, counter-conducts that involve “asking how not to be 
governed like that” can open up valuable reflections on alternative planning 
rationalities and subject positions. By provoking questions about the principle of 
planning being governed by financial logics, interviews with key players and 
homeowners generated a range of claims about alternative principles that would be 
threatened by DBs. Central to this were three key ideas rooted in homo-politicus’ 
domain of “democratic discussion, law and policy” (Brown, 2015: 221): 1. that 
planning decisions cannot be bought and sold but should be based on policy and law, 
drawing on criteria that define good land-use outcomes rather than financial 
incentives; 2. that planning gain should operate at a collective level to better capture 
land values and ensure provision of infrastructure and services, and; 3. that this should 
be underpinned by democratic processes and enable local deliberation (and 
disagreement).  
 
Refusals to be governed by DB should not be read to entail any wider resistance to 
neoliberal hegemony, nor should they should be assumed to offer a politically 
progressive alternative to the challenges of planning for housing (cf. Huxley, 2018, 
214). Establishing an alternative planning rationality on the basis of these alternative 
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principles, therefore, remains a significant political challenge. Despite that, these 
might be considered three key pillars of a prospective planning rationalityx that could 
be developed and expanded as a basis not just to defend against the scapegoating of 
planning but to strengthen alternatives to the political rationality of neoliberalism and 
its governing logics in England and beyond. Even in the context of pervasive state-
phobia, it seems many citizens continue to see a role for the state in allocating land for 
development based on planning rather than financial principles.   
 
Conclusions   
Recent experiments with financial incentives, like the DB proposal discussed here, 
have targeted the “heart and soul” of planning in England, seeking to transform 
established planning rationalities by appealing to the financially motivated self-
interest of homo-oeconomicus in order to overcome opposition to housing 
development. This reflects the power of a particular variant of behavioural economics 
within UK government which resonated with prevailing neoliberal critique of 
planning being fundamentally anti-development.     
 
Whilst this paper has focused on the specificities of planning in England, the DB 
experiment has wider resonance for understanding the ways in which neoliberal 
rationalities seek (and frequently fail) to govern planning. In particular, we have 
argued that the DB episode offers three contributions to debates on the contemporary 
politics of planning.  
 
First, in a context of neoliberal state-phobia and the scapegoating of planning, it 
illustrates a need to examine how both planning and opposition to development are 
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constructed as problems requiring neoliberal reform; carefully assessing the 
relationships between the politics of opposition, planning processes and their impacts 
on development. 
 
Secondly, strong, principled resistance to the encroachment of financial 
considerations in England highlights a need to pay close analytical attention to 
planning not just as a site of ongoing neoliberal experimentation but also of 
resistances and ‘counter-conducts’. Despite a longstanding political project to 
undermine the legitimacy of public planning, the DB experiment revealed 
commitments to engaging with planning decision-making through the logics and 
practices of homo-politicus rather than homo-oeconomicus (Brown, 2015). Refusals 
to be governed ‘like that’, may therefore contain important insights into alternative 
planning rationalities. 
 
Thirdly, we have speculated that the apparent ‘failure’ of the DB policy in England 
might be symptomatic of ‘late’ neoliberalism in which the political significance of the 
housing question has begun to unsettle core assumptions underpinning governing 
rationalities. In this context, opportunities may emerge to articulate alternatives to the 
neoliberal government of planning, questioning the extent to which market discipline 
and economic methods can be relied on to realise public interest objectives. 
Ultimately perhaps principles of democratic planning may take on renewed value in 
the search for pathways out of late neoliberalism. 
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i Due to devolution, the UK government makes planning policy for England. 
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ii The ‘Housing crisis’ is a complex political construction that cannot be understood solely through the 
economic logics of supply and demand. A well-evidenced shortfall in new housing has, however, been 
a key concern of successive governments. 
iiiThe Coalition Government did not set a national target, but in 'Laying the Foundations: A Housing 
Strategy for England' (HM Government, 2011) projected household growth of 232,000 per annum. 
200,000 should therefore be considered at the lower estimate with general agreement that a completion 
rate of 240,000-300,000 is needed to keep up with new demand and the backlog (Archer and Cole, 
2016). Significantly the private sector has never built at this rate during the post-war period, suggesting 
a need to reconsider a role for the state in direct housing provision, something that has been 
ideologically opposed under neoliberal government. 
iv Rationalities are defined by Dean (1999, 11) as a “form of thinking which strives to be relatively 
clear, systematic and explicit about aspects of ‘external’ and ‘internal’ existence, about how things are 
or how they ought to be...there is a multiplicity of rationalities, of different ways of thinking in a fairly 
systematic manner, of making calculations of defining purposes and employing knowledge”.  
v Despite extensive reforms since 2010 that have substantially and regressively redistributed funds, 
local government funding in England at this time remained reliant on a central distribution rather than 
the local tax base, a fact that arguably shaped local government attitudes towards growth. 
vi  This included the introduction of resident-led ‘neighbourhood development plans’ with statutory 
status which government promoted as a symbol of localism. Perhaps tellingly, however, 
neighbourhood groups are not allowed to propose any reduction in the housing allocations set by local 
authorities and have been incentivized to plan for higher levels of housebuilding. Two neighbourhood 
plan areas were included in the research reported here but responses to DB were consistent with other 
locations. 
vii In the UK ‘planning gain’ refers to the extraction of development value by public authorities to fund 
the provision of infrastructure or services. 
viii Whilst such reasons may act as a cypher for outright opposition (Field et al, 2012), for present 
purposes we understand them at face value as key contemporary discourses of objection. 
ix The theoretical evaluation report remained unpublished until a Freedom of Information request led to 
its disclosure in July, 2017.  
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x This section of the paper develops loosely from Foucault’s (2008, 91-95) suggestive remarks about 
the failure of socialism to develop an “autonomous governmentality”, considering the implications of 
our argument for the development of an autonomous planning rationality as an alternative to the 
neoliberal problematisation of planning. 
